There is still a controversy if human volitions and actions are governed by causal laws or obeys free will. Neurosciences start to study the neural correlates of free will by investigating how brains make decisions. Here, some of questions about free will are discussed from the neurosciences point of view taking into consideration a neuroeconomic model of decision making. This model is used here with the purpose of providing very formal definitions of key concepts raised in any free will discussion such as goals, necessity, motivation, etc., and to provide a formal background for discussing decision making. One of the conclusions of this discussion is that free will is computable but unpredictable, therefore not submitted to causal laws. In addition, the electroencephalogram was recorded in an experiment about choice selection of alternative actions and it presented here as an example of how neurosciences may study the neural correlates of free will.
Introduction
As put by Mill in his A System of Logic: "the question, whether the law of causality applies in the same strict sense to phenomena, is the celebrated controversy concerning the freedom of the will". Those asserting human volitions and actions to be determined and necessary are called Necessitarians and their theory is either called Necessity Theory or Determinism. The metaphysical Theory of Free Will opposes such a conception and it is fundamental for religious, moral, legal and ethical issues. This negative maintains that the will is not determined, like other phenomena, by specific causes (antecedents), but linked to motives.
Although the human brain is endowed for attributing a cause/effect relationship to events that are frequently observed in temporal order, and to deduce natural laws from these observations, most of us firmly believed that motives and volition did not obey such rule. Volition is assumed to influence the way we see the world 1 and to be determined by individual needs.
Neurosciences start to study the neural correlates of free will by investigating how brains make decisions. But as in any other field of science, the success of this endeavor is mostly dependent on choosing the adequate questions to investigate, what implies to clearly defining the meaning of words such as necessity, motivation, intention, purpose, etc. First it is necessary to clearly define the fundamental concepts involved in the understanding of free will, in order to search for their neural correlates.
Any living being has to use available resources to maintain its identity in space and time. This means that any living being has as primordial goals to at least obtain the resources to synthesize their constituent chemicals, to obtain energy to support the chemical transactions and to allow it to creating other similar living beings, that is to say, reproduce itself (Rocha and Rocha, 2011, Rocha, 2013) . Because resources are finite, goal achievement and maintenance creates necessity for goods and services. Such necessities motivate the animal to act in order to obtain these goods and services.
Decision making about how to satisfy needs is, therefore, the key issue in living (Rocha and Rocha, 2011) . As life complexity increases other goals are implemented to maintain individual identity. Men, for example, free their goals from being linked only to survival and reproduction in the pursuit of comprehending more than just the world of 1 For this purpose see: The world as will and representation (Schopenhauer, 1818) causes and effects 2 . The complexity of motivations increases as life evolutes on Earth, and put increasingly demands upon computation resources to support decision making.
Mechanic laws describe the effects of mechanic forces upon objects and they have always to be obeyed. Quantum mechanics deals with probabilistic relations between events and its laws have to incorporate these uncertainties. However, these laws establish fixed relations between successive events such that results obey fixed proportions.
Decision-making is, on the contrary, subject to priorities. Necessity of nutrients motivates eating whose priority depends on other pending necessities. How priorities are determined is a fundamental issue in discussing free will, because priority distinguishes motivated guided action from caused ones.
Preferences and aversions dictate priority and there is no preference or aversion in the realm of causality. Preferences and aversions are handle by widespread circuits in the brain and subject to both brain biochemistry diverstity and learning (Bernstein, 2008; Fehr and Krajbich , 2014; Obashi et al, 2009; Rocha et al, 2009; Rocha, 2013, Symmonds and Dolan, 2012; Tusche et al, 2013) . Due to human diversity, supported both by genetics and learning, some people dislike what other persons prefer.
Choice is another key issue in decision making. Necessity of nutrients motivates eating but most of the time anyone has a choice of. Necessity satisfaction may be supplied by alternative actions, each one providing a given benefit at a specific cost and risk (Furman and Wang, 2008; Rocha et al, 2009 , Wright et al, 2013 . Choice is dependent on considering benefits, costs and risks of opportunity that is on comparison between the expected benefit, cost and risk for each alternative action (Rocha et al, 2009, Rocha and Rocha, 2011) . Deciding about alternative actions is a high cost reasoning process that not all individuals may always support.
The purpose of the present paper is to discuss some of questions about free will from the neurosciences point of view taking into consideration the neuroeconomic model of decision making proposed by Rocha et al (2009) . This model is used here with the purpose of providing a very formal definition of the key concepts raised in any free will discussion. For this purpose it is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the background on which concepts like goals, necessity, motivation, willingness, etc. are to be understood in this paper. Section 3 outlines the neuroeconomic model for decision making. Section 4 discusses neurosciences evidences of genetic inheritance and learning influences on motivation diversity, considered here a fundamental issue against free will determinism. Section 5 discusses and clearly proposes free will as computable but unpredictable. Section 6 discusses reasoning supporting choice decision as another key issue in discussions about free will. Section 7 describes a simple experiment to show how free may be studied from the neuroscience point of view. Section 8 concludes the present discussion.
To live is to decide
Individual identity is defined by two sets of goals. Goals that individuals strive to achieve and maintain because they are supportive of their identity (called here 
Neuroeconomic reasoning
Each action has a cost, implies a risk and provides a benefit. The amount of benefit is the amount services or good provided by the action compared to that required to satisfy the motivating necessity. In this way, benefit is also dependent on motivation, The willingness of implementing a give action is mainly determined by the ratio ( benefit risk ) between the expected action benefit and risk, once high cost reduces benefit and increases risk. If benefit is high concerning risk, action implementation is highly possible. In the contrary, if risk is high concerning benefit, action implementation has low possibility. Whenever the ratio benefit risk approaches 1, conflict about action implementation increases and induces procrastination. In this context, Rocha and Rocha (2011) proposed: There is a rich neuroscience literature showing that benefit evaluation involves dopamine circuits (e.g., Berridge, 2003; Ernst et al, 2004; van Gaalen et al, 2006; Obayashi et al, 2009; O'Doherty et al, 2001) ; Panksepp, 1998) ; risk assessment enrolls serotoninergic neurons (e.g., Graeff, 2003) ; Ledoux,1996) ; Panksepp, 1998); Wright et al, 2013) , and cost evaluation is a subject for adrenergic circuits (e.g., Ledoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998; Rocha and Rocha, 2011) . In addition, it is a consensus now that
Orbitofrontal and Medialprefrontal cortices (see Figure 2 ) are involved in preference encoding (e.g., Platt and Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Obayashi et al, 2009 ); Amigdala is a key structure in fear assessment (e.g., Ledoux, 1996) ; O'Doherty et al, 2001; Panksepp (1998) ; Symmonds and Dolan, 2012) ; Insula has an important role in aversion and risk assessment (e.g., Ledoux, 1996; O'Doherty et al 2001; Panksepp,1998); Wright et al, 2013; Paulus et al 2002 Paulus et al , 2003 ; Nucleus Accumbens is a key structure in handling reward prediction and assessment (e.g., Ernst et al, 2004; van Gaalen et al, 2006; Obayashi et al, 2009; O'Doherty et al, 2001; Panksepp, 1998) . Finally, it was proposed that calculation of both intention and probability of acting enrolls neuron located in parietal areas (e.g., Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004; Paulus et al, 2002; Rogers et al, 2006; Wright et al 2013) .
Inheritance and Learning determine motivation
All neural transmitters and modulators influencing benefit, risk and cost assessment are genetically encoded and subjected to the genetic variation of human species. This is because different people are prone to like or dislike different goals; to be risk seeking or risk avoiding; high or low energetic, etc., and therefore vary in their preferences and aversions. Genetic variation makes also people to have different necessities even sharing similar goals. All of this contributes to distinct individuals differ on their motivations and therefore behaving and learning differently.
There is a rich literature showing that gene expression influences neuronal connectivity and activity of neural circuits, and because of this, to be one of the determinants of cognition, affection, personality and pathological behavior (e.g., Alcar, et al, 2007; Alsiö, Olszewski et al 2010; Berman et al, 2002; Bjorklund, Dunnett, 2007 , Bromberg-Martin et al, 2010 Graff-Guerrero et al, 2005; Hariri and Holmes, 2006; Judith etl al, 2012; Jönsson et al, 2003; Kazantseva et al, 2011; Laucht et al, 2007; Mizuno et al, 2006; Myers et al, 2007; Nilsson et al, 2012; Shinichiro et al, 2013; Waldman and Gizer, 2006) . In addition gene expression is subject to environmental influence and learning (e.j., Bjorklund, Dunnett, 2007; Graff-Guerrero et al, 2005; Judith etl al, 2012; Rocha et al, 2006; Rocha, 1997) such that both genetic and environmental variability make motivation to vary among people and during their life time.
Once action is implemented or not, the outcome is evaluated. This evaluation guides learning that may modify preferences or aversions as well as knowledge used to map necessities into motivation (Figure 1 ). Pleasant outcomes reinforce knowledge that maps necessity into the implemented actions, while unpleasant outcomes contribute to reinforce mapping of necessity to alternative actions other than the implemented ones. It have been shown (e.g, Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Rocha, 1997; Rocha et al, 1998 Rocha et al, , 2005 Schultz, 2002; Schultz, 2004; 2007) that neurons in various areas of the brain evaluate experienced benefit concerning the expected one, having their activity increased if experienced exceeds expected benefit or decreased in the opposite case.
Activity in these circuits remains the same if experienced matches expected benefit.
Learning occurs according to these evaluations, and preferences, aversions and knowledge are updated accordingly. In the same way, other neural circuits are in charge of monitoring risks and costs and promoting the required adjustment of preferences, aversions and knowledge. Learning, therefore, makes motivation to vary during the individual life time.
Free will is computable but not predictable
From all the above, it may be affirmed that decision making is computable. Each one of us, use our neural circuits to define our goals in FSV and ______ FSV ; to identify our necessities of goods and services to handle these goals; to know how to act in order to satisfy these necessities; to evaluate how success we are in satisfy our, and to adapt ourselves to the available resources to keep life running. We may differ in our success of doing all of this, but we are able to reason (compute) about all of these things. This is true unless we are cognitively impaired by illness or genetic inheritance. But this discussion is not a subject for the present paper.
The fact that decision making is computable makes free will computable, too, but not necessarily completely predictable either by us as well as by our peers. Short term unpredictability is associated with procrastination; hence it is a function of conflict, which in turn depends on the expected ratio benefit risk . Unpredictability in the long run is a consequence from learning; hence it is influenced among other by available resources and individual's skill.
Motivated reasoning differs from causal reasoning. An effect has always to follow the cause, even in case of probabilistic systems when different effects have to follow a given cause at fixed probabilities. A given action has not always to follow a given necessity, because for instance, preferences or aversions vary in time and among people. It does not strictly follow that necessity of nutrients makes the individual to eat, because the decision is subject to preference concerning other concurrent necessities, too. A mechanical force has always to make a body to move; to move or not is not a matter of preference either of the force or the body.
Choice selection
Choice of actions is in general available for satisfying most of (if not all)
individual's necessities. Choice selection is proposed to be based on a neuroeconomic reasoning taking into consideration benefit and risk of opportunity (Rocha et al, 2009; Rocha and Rocha, 2011; .
Given two possible alternative actions i a , j a that may satisfy a given necessity, the benefit of opportunity of i a given j a is equal to its expected benefit between their expected risks i r and j r . In other words, the benefit of opportunity of i a given the alternative actions is equal to its expected benefit discounted its risk referred to risk associated with the alternative actions.
In the same line of reasoning, the risk of opportunity of i a given j a is equal to its Reasoning about alternative actions is a key issue to the freedom of decision making, but as discussed above is not a necessary one. Time and/or neural computational restrictions (such as neural impairment, inheritance, learning, etc.) may difficult or impede deciding about alternative actions, but even in this condition the individual may decide about acting or not.
An experiment on alternative actions
The electric (temporal electric field variation) activity recorded by a set of A detailed description of this EEG analysis is found in Rocha et al (2010) and PCA identifies, in general, 3 different patterns of brain activity (P 1 , P 2 and P 3 in Figure 3 ) explaining 80% of ) ( i e H covariation and associated with of 3 different types of neural circuits in decision making (Rocha et al, 2009 ; see also http://www.eina.com.br/index_ingles.php ):
1) Pattern P 1 is proposed to disclose the activity of the neural circuits enrolled in recognizing the possible problem solutions and evaluating their associated risks and benefits;
2) Pattern P 3 is proposed to disclose the activity of neural circuits in charge of calculating action adequacy, fairness and willingness taking into consideration the results calculated by P 1 neural networks, and 3) Pattern P 2 is proposed to disclose the activity of the executive neural systems in charge to trigger decision making process and selecting the action to be implemented taking into consideration information provided by P1 and P 3 neural networks.
In this study, 20 individual (10 males and 10 females) saw a video about the necessity of killing a mosquito in baby's room, using either spray or plug-in insecticide or a piece of fabric ( in experiment 1); and made 3 pair wise decisions in experiment 2 (see figures 3) while their 10/20 EEG was recorded (impedance below 10 Kohm; lowpass filter 50Hz, sampling frequency of 256 Hz and 10 bits of resolution). For this purpose, two networked computers were used and EEG analysis followed the procedures described in Rocha et al, 2010 . Between experiment 1 and 2, volunteers judged 12 moral dilemmas . EEG epochs of 2 seconds after possible solution display in the video in experiment I, and 2 seconds before the volunteer select its option in experiment II were used for PCA analysis.
Figure 1 -Experiment I -a video shows a flying mosquito in the baby's room (V and R) and the alternative actions: using spray (S); or plug-in device (P) or a piece of fabric (F) to kill the mosquito. Experiment II -volunteer had to make pair wise choices of alternative solutions to kill the mosquito.
Results show that plug-in (P) was chosen in 60% of the decisions; spray (S) was selected in 30% of times and fabric was chosen the remaining 10% of the decisions (Figure 4) . These results may be explained by assuming, for example, that spray odor was associated with baby´s harm and fabric with high possibility of failure in the attempt to kill the mosquito. If such hypothesis holds true, the plug-in device was assigned the smallest risk and fabric was associated with the highest one. For all conditions, benefit, that is to protect the baby, was the same. In this condition, willingness to act is expected to be greater for using plug-in insecticide concerning the alternatives of spray insecticide or the piece of fabric. The most important pattern differences are observed when the two experiments are compared. Pattern P 1 in experiment 2 is composed almost exclusively by posterior temporal (T5 and T6) electrodes and the occipital (O1, O2 and OZ) electrodes, while in experiment 1 it also included the anterior temporal electrodes (T3 and T4 If the above discussion is accepted as true, then the type of experiment described here, despite its simplicity, may be one way to study the neurodynamics of free will.
More complex and informative studies may be planed to better understand the complexities of a free decision making, but the present results at least show that this type of experiment is feasible.
Conclusion
Another fundamental issue on free will discussion is consciousness. This is because many people require free will to be supported by conscious decision making.
The experiments by Libet et al (1983 Libet et al ( , 1985 call this into question. He asked volunteers to choose a random moment to flick their wrist while recording their EEG. To determine when subjects felt the intention to move, he asked them to watch the second hand of a clock. After making a movement, the volunteer reported the time on the clock when they first felt the conscious intention to move. Analyzing the readness potential that it is an EEG signal of the pre-motor planning of volitional movement, Libet found that the unconscious brain activity of the readiness potential leading up to subjects'
movements began approximately half a second before the subject was aware of a conscious intention to move.
Here, a neuroeconomic model for decision making was used to discuss and support free will without any reference about consciousness. However, it was stressed that conflict makes decision harder and reasoning about alternative is computationally costly. Rocha et al (2004 Rocha et al ( , 2011 proposed consciousness to be promoted by quantum events at synaptic level and to be associated with hard decisions, when either conflict is high or choice is complex.
Synaptic quantum events support quantum computing. In contrast to classic computing that depends on flipping of binary states, quantum computing takes advantage of the collapse of many entangled states into one specific state. While binary state flipping furnishes 1 bit of information, flipping of quantum states furnishes an amount of information (qbit) that depends on the number of entangled states. In this condition, quantum computing devices have a computational capacity that is orders of magnitude higher than classic computing devices. This is because conscious processing would be required in case of hard decisions. But free will is not only about hard decisions, it is about any decision. Therefore, consciousness is not a necessary component of free will.
In conclusion it may be said that knowledge provided by neurosciences strongly support free will as an inherently property of motivated guided actions in contrast to the determinism of caused events.
